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I. CORRUPTION: A ROUTINE PRACTICE, BUT NOT FOR LONG
Since the end of World War II, the world has gradually begun to develop
a global marketplace.' Europe sought to insure peace and create economic
stability through the creation of the European Coal and Steel Commission
(ECSC) in the late 1940s, an entity that eventually evolved into the common
market of the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU).2 The
need for economic stability was not just sought by states on a regional basis
after World War II, but states also sought to create a worldwide trading system
in the form of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and later
the World Trade Organization (WTO).3 This progression illustrates a clear
trend toward open markets and free trade.4 Scholars recognize that "the
driving force [of this trend] is international competitiveness."5 The immoral
and pervasive practice of bribery and corruption of government officials by
international businesses undermines competition in the international market,
ultimately inhibiting free trade and economic development in many countries.
Bribery is a common aspect of doing international business throughout the
world even though it "distorts international trade, increases the cost of
economic development, and undermines democratic principles of
government."6  The World Bank notes that corruption has a "negative
relationship [with] per capita GDP[,] . . . lowers the quality of public
infrastructure[,] . . . encourage[s] regulatory burden[,] . . . distorts public
expenditures[,] . . . lower[s] public satisfaction with health care[, . . .]
undermines the official economy, [and] reduces the effectiveness of
development aid and increases inequality and poverty."7 Robert S. Leiken has
JAMES HANLON, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 3 (3d ed. 2003).
2 Id.
3 PETER VAN DEN BOssCHE, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
77-81 (2005).
4 Michael A. Almond & Scott D. Syfert, Beyond Compliance: Corruption, Corporate
Responsibility and Ethical Standards in the New Global Economy, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM.
REG. 389, 391 (1997).
Id.
6 David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a
New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 457, 458 (1998).
7 WORLD BANK, REPORT No. 29620, MAINSTREAMING ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES IN
WORLD BANK ASSISTANCE: A REVIEW OF PROGRESS SINCE 1997, at 1 (2004), available at
http://lnweb 18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/b57456d58aba40e585256ad400736404/0483
51 b87697 1 b9285256eed006aae69/$FILE/anti corruption.pdf(citations omitted). Ofparticular
interest, this report notes that a government project's return is lower by 2.5% for every increased
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testified before the U.S. Senate in regard to the need for widespread use of
anti-corruption law, saying that "reducing bribery, smuggling and kickbacks
is part and parcel of free trade; anti-corruption is part and parcel of democracy.
Today's decisive battles for free trade, development and democracy may well
be fought on the terrain of corrupt practices."'
This battle has begun. The U.N. General Assembly has condemned bribery
and corruption in international business transactions, noting that efforts to stop
bribery of government officials will improve international trade.9 According
to the General Assembly, combating bribery enhances fairness and
competition, promotes transparent and accountable governance, and promotes
development and environmental protection.'0 The United Nations is not the
only international organization to recognize the positive effect an anti-bribery
law will have on international trade, as many other organizations now have
anti-bribery policies or conventions.1
In order for anti-bribery rules to have the desired effects on international
trade, the ideals set forth by the international community in its various treaties
and conventions must be implemented at the state level. Before the anti-
bribery movement of the 1990s, "the United States... was the only major
trading nation to make it a criminal offense for its own firms and individuals
to make certain 'corrupt' payments to foreign government officials illegal
point of corruption (as measured according to the ICRG six-point corruption rating scale). Id.
' Hearings of the Senate Caucus on Int'l Narcotics Control & the Senate Finance Comm.
Subcomm. on Int'l Crime, 104th Cong. (1996) (testimony of Robert S. Leiken, President ofNew
Moment, a non-profit organization dealing on issues of international democracy), quoted in
Almond & Syfert, supra note 4, at 391.
' See United Nations Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions, G.A. Res. 51/191, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Annex 1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/51/191 (Dec. 16, 1996), reprinted in 36 .L.M. 1043, 1046-47 (1997) [hereinafter U.N.
Declaration].
10 Id.
" These organizations include the European Union (see Convention on the Fight Against
Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of
the European Union, Euro. Union, May 26, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 195) 1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M.
12 (1998)); the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (see Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 18,
1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention]); the International Monetary Fund
(see International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2007) (discussing
various articles and reports regarding the IMF's anti-bribery role in surveillance and
accountability of government funds and promotion of government transparency)); the World
Bank (see WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1997) (laying out the general
framework for anti-bribery policy)).
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under its own law.... 2 This situation, where U.S. firms' international
competitors were not subject to the same criminal sanctions for bribery, put
U.S. citizens and companies in a difficult competitive position in the ever
growing global economy. This situation, along with the ill effects bribery has
on states, particularly in the developing world, was to be rectified by the
conventions, particularly the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention). 3
But has the situation been rectified? Are foreign firms now on equal
footing while they compete with U.S. firms in developing countries? Although
many signatories to the OECD Convention claim to have implemented the
Convention into their domestic law,14 not all states are implementing the law
with equal strength. The United Kingdom and the United States are two major
trading nations and trading competitors who have both reported
implementation of the OECD Convention. 5 However, this Note contends that
Britain's laws against bribery of foreign officials are less stringent than their
American counterparts' and that the U.K. laws fall short of the OECD
Convention.
This Note will demonstrate that Britain's complex and ambiguous statutory
language creates doubt as to the enforceability of anti-bribery law on British
companies, which may concern competing U.S. companies. Part II of this Note
will entertain a discussion of the history in international bribery law, including
a recounting of the American-led creation of the OECD Convention. Part III
contains an in-depth look at each states' implementing legislation, the U.S.'s
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act' 6 and the U.K.'s corresponding corruption laws.
Part IV discusses the adequacy of both the American and British
12 Gantz, supra note 6, at 457.
13 OECD Convention, supra note 11.
4 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REPORT BY THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES:
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS
IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION (2002), available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/59/2087917.pdf [hereinafter OECD PROGRESS REPORT
2002].
"5 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, STEPS TAKEN BY THE
36 STATE PARTIES TO IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: SUBMISSIONS AS OF
JULY 2006 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/33/1827022.pdf [hereinafter
OECD PROGRESS REPORT 2006].
6 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1-3 (1998).
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
implementations of the OECD Convention, as well as the differences between
American and British anti-bribery law. Part V concludes with a
recommendation of what actions Britain should take with regard to satisfying
its international obligation, including a look at the proposed Draft Corruption
Bill17 that may in fact be a sound implementation of the OECD Convention.
II. AMERICA'S CORRUPTION LEGACY: FROM NIXON'S SHAME TO
CLINTON'S TRIUMPH
A. Watergate: Tricky Dick Opens America's Eyes and Congress Reacts
When an American thinks of government corruption, one of the first things
he or she will think of is the infamous Watergate scandal. This widely-
publicized misuse of official power removed a president, and when combined
with the alleged government deceptions in regard to the Vietnam War,
significantly eroded Americans' trust in their own government institutions.18
The Senate's investigations of the campaign contributions and the Nixon
administration led to an investigation of American companies by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), whose discovery was perhaps equally
shocking. The SEC investigation "led to admissions ... of foreign bribery
totaling over $300 million by over 400 American corporations, of which 177
ranked in the Fortune 500."'9 The most notable of these corruptions involved
American defense contractor, Lockheed Martin, which resorted to an enormous
pattern of bribery to high-ranking officials (prime ministers, presidents, and
princes) in Germany, Sweden, Iran, the Netherlands, Japan, and Italy.2°
It soon became clear that such corrupt practices existed globally on a large
scale, and many in the United States recognized that multinational responses
" See infra Part V.
'8 Seegenerally SUSAN CARRUTHERS, THE MEDIA AT WAR: COMMUNICATION AND CONFLICT
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2000).
"9 Peter W. Schroth, 43 Years of Transnational Law Against Corruption (of Which 40 in the
United States Alone), Post-lunch Address to the Conference on Governance and Corporate
Social Responsibility in the New Millennium 6 (Nov. 26-27, 2001), available at http:Ilwww.
deakin.edu.aulbuslaw/aef/confs/deakinconf/GCSRC200 1/schroth.pdf(last visited Jan. 17,2007)
(emphasis added). Some of the more notable companies include GulfOil Corporation (admitting
$4 million in bribes to South Korea), General Tire & Rubber Company (admitting bribes in
Algeria, Mexico, and Venezuela), and Exxon Corporation (admitting bribes to fifteen States,
including $19 million to Italy). Id.
20 Id. at 5-6.
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were needed.2' The international community responded inadequately, simply
making policy statements in favor of anti-corruption law, while not including
any mechanisms for enforcement or even monitoring of the bribery situation.22
American lawmakers, actively investigating widespread corruption and abuse
of power in both the public and private sectors, decided not to wait for a
multinational response to bribery and enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act in 1977 (FCPA). This Act was the first domestic law made by a state that
criminalized bribery of foreign officials by its own citizens. 23 The law attacks
foreign bribery by requiring two things: (1) "record-keeping, internal
accounting controls and disclosure, and . . . [(2)] by outlawing certain
categories of payments."24
B. Clinton's Less Noted, but Important Legacy: Making International Anti-
Corruption Law a Priority
Almost immediately following the creation of the FCPA, the United States
attempted to get the international community to follow suit through a series of
United Nations discussions on the topic of reducing bribery of foreign
officials, but these talks broke down by 1981. 2' Despite the competitive
disadvantage, created by the FCPA, that American businesses faced in relation
to their competitors who were allowed to bribe, the creation of a multinational
consensus against bribery was not a priority of the U.S. government until the
Clinton Presidency.26 In 1994, the United States began to put pressure on other
nations to "build an international consensus against the bribery of foreign
officials in international business transactions. 27 U.S. Trade Representative
Mickey Kantor also attempted to use the newly-established WTO to fight
corruption, urging the Director General of the organization that "an important
first step [in finding a role for the WTO] would be through increasing
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id. U.S.-initiated GATT discussions of a code of conduct for international business were
met with a "deafening silence." Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. See also infra Part IV (discussing the mechanics of how the law fights foreign
bribery).
25 Gantz, supra note 6, at 466.
26 Schroth, supra note 19, at 7. See also Almond & Syfert, supra note 4, at 399-400.
27 Almond & Syfert, supra note 4, at 427 (quoting Warren Christopher, U.S. Sec'y of State,
Toward a More Integrated World, Statement Before the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (June 20, 1994)).
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transparency... in government procurement systems in all WTO member
[countries].""s
Several organizations have addressed the issue of bribery of foreign
officials. The United Nations adopted Model Laws on Procurement of Goods
and Construction in 1993 and on Services in 1994, which contained anti-
bribery provisions.29 However, mostly due to United States' instigation, the
United Nations began a focused effort against bribery in 1996 by taking
several steps to condemn the practice.3" The first measure adopted by the
General Assembly was the adoption of an International Code of Conduct for
Public Officials.3 However, this code's effect in combating bribery was weak
for two reasons. First, the code avoided the use of the terms "bribery" or
"corruption" and instead used the term "conflict of interest."32 Second, the
operative language of the resolution "recommends" the code to the member
states to guide their own anti-corruption efforts.33
Thankfully, U.N. efforts did not end there, as the General Assembly later
adopted the broader and more detailed United Nations Declaration against
Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions.34 In this
declaration, U.N. member states "commit[ted] themselves[ ] to take effective
and concrete action to combat all forms of corruption, bribery and related illicit
practices in international commercial transactions...., Member states
specifically vowed "[t]o criminalize[ ] bribery of foreign[ ] officials in [a] ...
coordinated manner,, 36 and defined bribery as the "offering and the solicitation
of payments, gifts, and other advantages."37 Furthermore, "[t]he Declaration
calls for the elimination of the tax deductibility of bribes, and the enactment
28 Id. at 427. See also Gantz, supra note 6, at 466. Kantor characterized foreign bribery as
"an unfair tariffbarrier" whose existence would then be incompatible with the WTO prohibitions
on non-tarifftrade barriers. Gantz, supra note 6, at 465-66.
29 Almond & Syfert, supra note 4, at 439.
30 Gantz, supra note 6, at 470.
3' G.A. Res. 51/59, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/59 (Dec. 12, 1996),
reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 1039, 1040 (1996).
32 Conflict of interest language prohibits public officials from soliciting or receiving, directly
or indirectly, any gift or favor that "may influence the exercise of their functions, the
performance of their duties, or their judgment." Id.
3 Gantz, supra note 6, at 471.
31 U.N. Declaration, supra note 9.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Gantz, supra note 6, at 471.
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of effective accounting standards. ,,3" Despite the fact that this "Declaration
reflects the usual U.N. General Assembly concerns over national sovereignty
and territorial jurisdiction... it [was] clearly a step forward in obtaining broad
international recognition and condemnation of the problem of foreign
corruption."39
C. Building International Consensus: Other International Organizations
Begin to Make Law
Several regional organizations have made similar declarations condemning
the practice of bribery in international business transactions. The Council of
Europe first analyzed possible new criminal laws prohibiting corruption of
public officials as early as 1995.40 It was not until 1997 that the European
Union "concluded a draft convention against corruption" that "criminalize[d]
the offer or receipt of [ ] payments with regard to public officials. ... ."
However, its scope is extremely limited in that it applies only within E.U.
member states against the bribery of officials of E.U. member states.42 This
essentially allows citizens to bribe foreign officials so long as that official is
not from a member state. Thus the convention can be viewed more as a self-
protecting agreement between member states of the European Union since
there is no obligation to follow the convention outside the E.U.'s territory.
While the regional response from Europe was rather inadequate and limited
in its ability to fight bribery, across the Atlantic, the twenty-two members of
the Organization of American States completed the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption, which entered into force in 1997.43 This Convention was
more than a mere declaration that bribery was wrong. Instead, it contained
provisions intended specifically to prohibit and prosecute bribery of foreign
officials.' Specifically, the Convention laid out how states should order their
affairs and how they should establish preventative measures in regard to
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 472.
41 Id.
42 Id.
41 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
724 (1996).
4Id.
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bribery of foreign officials.45 Further, the Convention set forth what acts
specifically constituted corruption and bribery.46
D. The Capstone of the International Anti-Bribery Movement: The OECD
Convention
The most significant agreement formulated in the international community,
creating concrete rules to govern bribery in international business transactions
and adopted by the OECD on November 21, 1997, is the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Convention Against Bribery).4 This is considered "the
most significant effort to date ... because the OECD members are home to
most of the [world's] multinational corporations .... [and because] the
developed members of the OECD are the major capital goods exporting
nations of the world.... . 48 The creation of this Convention can be traced back
to the U.S. efforts, other private and public institutions, and the example set by
the Inter-American Convention.49
The U.S.-led movement toward the adoption of a multinational consensus
began in 1994 with the speech of Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the
OECD.5" This speech coincided with the establishment of a preliminary
consensus against bribery in the OECD-issued Recommendation on Bribery
in International Business Transactions.5 This necessary first step was small
in that the Recommendation was non-binding, but it got the ball rolling at the
very least.5 2 Under unrelenting U.S. pressure the OECD Convention was
established, albeit after several delays, and it set minimum requirements that
contracting parties have to implement.53 The OECD Convention is not limited
to particular regions, like the Organization of American States' convention and
the European Union's convention: it is global in scale. Due to its scale, it is
arguably the most important treaty on anti-bribery thus far, the implementation
41 Id. art. III.
46 Id. arts. VI, VIII.
4' Gantz, supra note 6, at 483.
48 Id. Of the $350 billion in global foreign direct investment flows, 66% went to developed
nations, all of whom are members of the OECD. Id.
49 Id.
'0 Almond & Syfert, supra note 4, at 427.
51 Gantz, supra note 6, at 483-84.
52 Id. at 484.
53 Id. at 485.
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of which is an accurate measure of the overall progress of the global anti-
bribery effort.
E. Making Sure States Keep Their Promises. The OECD Working Group on
Anti-Bribery in International Business Transactions
According to the OECD, the implementation of the OECD Convention
Against Bribery has progressed well.54 According to the Treaty, the
contracting parties shall establish an OECD Working Group on Bribery in
International Business Transactions whose responsibility is to carry out a
"programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full
implementation of [the] Convention."55 This program involved two distinct
phases through which the Group would monitor the implementation of the
Treaty into national law and determine its adequacy.56 "Mutual Evaluation"
characterizes the Working Group's Phase I and involves consultation and
notification with contracting parties in regard to their implementation.57 Phase
II involves a more in-depth look at each contracting party, as the Group spends
one week assessing the effectiveness of the states' anti-bribery laws in practice
through "intensive meetings in the examined country with key actors from
government, law enforcement authorities, business, trade unions and civil
society."" By 2002, this Working Group opined that the implementation of
54 OECD PROGRESS REPORT 2002, supra note 14.
5 OECD Convention, supra note 11, art. 12.
56 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Working Group on
Bribery in International Business Transactions, http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,2340,en_
2649_34855_35430021_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2007) [hereinafter Working
Group Website].
" Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention: Procedure of Self- and Mutual Evaluation - Phase 1, http://www.oecd.org/
document/21/0,2340,en_2649_34855_2022613_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
Phase 1 mutual evaluation includes:
" Preparation of the consultation in the Working Group on Bribery.
" Appointment of two countries to act as lead examiners.
" Country's reply to an evaluation questionnaire.
" Preparation of a provisional report on the country's performance.
" Consultation in the Working Group on Bribery.
" Adoption of a report, including conclusions, on the examined
country's performance.
Id.
58 Working Group Website, supra note 56.
2007]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
the OECD Convention was almost complete. 9 Although the Working Group
has found that nearly all states have implemented the Treaty, the Group notes
some issues still need to be addressed in regard to how the newly-passed laws
work in practice.6"
III. AGREE TO DISAGREE: AMERICAN AND BRITISH IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE OECD CONVENTION
A. The United States' Fight Against Corruption: The Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and American Implementation of the OECD Convention
The United States championed the idea of an OECD convention against
bribery of foreign officials, and its own adoption of this treaty may provide an
important benchmark in regard to the adequacy of implementation of the
convention. The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has outlawed
the bribery of foreign officials by United States citizens and corporations since
its enactment in 1977.61 In response to signing the OECD Convention Against
Corruption, Congress further supplemented the FCPA with the International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, which only slightly expanded
the already expansive FCPA.62 The law is quite pervasive in its criminalization
of payments to foreign officials, leaving little room for Americans to elicit
political favors from foreign officials in any way.63
1. Who Cannot Offer Bribes Under FCPA?
The U.S. law outlawing bribery of foreign officials casts a large net, as the
scope of the FCPA is nearly all-inclusive. The law first applies to all persons
and entities that may be deemed as from the United States, namely issuers of
59 OECD PROGRESS REPORT 2002, supra note 14, at 3.
60 Id. at 6.
6 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 16.
62 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WORKING GROUP ON
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 1 (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/1 6/50/2390377.pdf[hereinafter U.S. REPORTPHASE 1] (noting the 1998 Act expanded
the definition of "foreign official," added "securing any improper advantage" to those prohibited
purposes, and extended the power of the Attorney General to seek injunctions against non-U.S.
entities about to violate the FCPA).
63 See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 16.
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securities (typically publicly-traded companies)' and domestic concerns
(meaning all natural and juridical persons).6" However, the FCPA also
expands its jurisdictional scope to include non-American persons and entities
that practice bribery and reside in the United States.66 Thus, the jurisdictional
scope as to whom the law applies includes all persons or entities of the United
States and any other persons or entities that do business in the United States.
2. Who Must One Bribe to Be Convicted Under the FCPA?
A second element of the offense under U.S. law involves the scope of the
class of persons deemed to be foreign officials, or persons who cannot be
bribed, for the purposes of the statute. The statute lists three groups of persons
to whom payments will be considered bribery: foreign officials,67 foreign
political parties," and any person who is given "money or [a] thing of value
[knowing that it] will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to
any foreign official... [or] political party.... ,,69 The expansiveness of this
element is apparent in light of the statute's definition of the term "foreign
official," which applies the label not only to any officer of a foreign
government, but also to any employee or person acting "on behalf' of a foreign
government or its subdivisions.7" Furthermore, the FCPA applies not only to
officials, employees, and persons acting on behalf of foreign governments, but
also to members of recognized public international organizations.7 However,
- 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a).
65 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2; see also § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A)-(B) (defining domestic concern as "any
individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and any corporation,
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or
sole proprietorship which has its principal place of business in the United States or which is
organized under the laws of a State [or territory] of the United States").
66 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. This Act defines a person as "any natural person other than a national
of the United States . . . or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship organized under the law of
a foreign nation or a political subdivision thereof." Id. § 78dd-3(f)(l).
67 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(l), 78dd-3(a)(l).
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(2), 78dd-2(a)(2), 78dd-3(a)(2). The statute applies not only to
political parties but also to "official[s] thereof or any candidate for foreign political office ..
Id. 69 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3).
70 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(1)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A).
71 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(2)(A), 78dd-2(h)(2)(A), 78dd-3(f)(2)(A). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-
1 (f)(1)(B), 78dd-2(h)(2)(B), 78dd-3(f)(2)(B) (providing two ways that a "public international
organization" may be determined: either (i) by designation by Executive Order according to
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the bribe need not be placed in the hands of a foreign official, or its equivalent,
for it to violate the FCPA.72 The United States confirms that a situation where
a person gains a political favor or business gain from a foreign official by
paying money to a third party would violate the statute.73
This definition of foreign official is broader than the definition required of
the United States by the OECD Convention. The OECD Convention defines
foreign official to mean "any person holding a legislative, administrative or
judicial office of [or in] a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any
person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public
agency or public enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international
organisation.
' 74
3. What Acts Constitute Bribes Under the FCPA?
Third, the acts proscribed by the FCPA are those made "in furtherance of
an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of
anything of value to. . . ." a foreign official, defined later in the statute.75
Thus, the statute broadly defines a bribe to include not just money, but to
include anything of value, making it nearly impossible to enrich a foreign
official without implicating the statute. Although the FCPA can only
prosecute U.S. entities that commit bribery in the United States, and where the
act is committed through interstate commerce, in practice this "interstate nexus
requirement" is typically a non-issue.76 So, U.S. businesses and persons will
be prosecuted for bribery of foreign officials occurring domestically almost
exactly as they would abroad.77 Thus, U.S. businesses may be similarly
prosecuted for any act in furtherance of a bribe anywhere in the world.78
section 1 of the International Organizations Immunities Act, or (ii) by designation by the
President through any other Executive Order for the purposes of the FCPA).
72 U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 7.
71 Id. The logic is that the ability to designate a third party as the beneficiary of the bribe is
still a benefit to the foreign official, despite the apparent intangibility of the benefit, under the
broad definition of bribery.
74 OECD Convention, supra note 11, art. 1 (4)(a).
75 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
76 See U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 3.
77 Id.
78 id.
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4. What Level of Intent Is Required by the FCPA?
A fourth and rather complex element of the offense set forth by the FCPA
involves the mens rea of the defendant. First, the language of the statute
requiring that the person act "corruptly in furtherance of [a bribe]" reads into
the statute a scienter requirement of corrupt intent.79 This corrupt intent
requirement is coupled with the FCPA scienter requirement that the bribe to
a foreign official be for one of four broad, enumerated purposes. According
to the FCPA, the bribe must be for the purposes of:
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of [the official] in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing [the official] to do or omit to do
any act in violation of [his or her] lawful duty.... (iii) securing
any improper advantage; or (B) inducing [the official] to use his
influence with a foreign government. . . to affect or influence
any act or decision of such [foreign] government... in order to
assist [the briber] in obtaining or retaining business for or with,
or directing business to, any person ....
Thus the FCPA requires that a person make his bribe for one of these purposes
corruptly, which when applied to natural persons involves a willfulness
standard of mental culpability.
In short, the FCPA will find a natural or legal person in violation when he
makes a bribe to influence a foreign official on the premise that he will use his
influence to help the briber obtain or retain business or have business directed
to some other beneficiary of the briber's choosing. The mens rea requirements
set forth by this portion of the statute, requiring that the purpose of the giving
of the gift involve some sort of official capacity of the bribed official, as well
as a corrupt intent and purpose of the briber, ensures that the actions targeted
by the FCPA are truly those involving bribery and corruption of foreign
officials."
79 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
80 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)(A)-(B), (3)(A)-(B) (1998); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-
2(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)(A)-(B), (3)(A)-(B) (1998); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)(A)-(B),
(3)(A)-(B.
8I See also U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 7-8. The Working Group also notes that
the statute only allows prosecution of individuals whose bribery is in regard to international
business. Although this is a valid distinction, in a practical sense most payments by U.S.
businesses or citizens to foreign officials for one of the four purposes will "necessarily involve
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One further safeguard in the statute, which ensures persons convicted under
that statute are in fact making corrupt payments, involves the exception from
prosecution for payments made for "routine government action."82 Under this
provision, persons who make "facilitating or expediting payment[s] to [ ]
foreign official[s] ... the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the
performance of a routine governmental action... ." cannot be found guilty of
bribing foreign officials. 3 Thus an important issue becomes what exactly
constitutes a "routine government action." The statute stipulates that the term
does not include any part of the decision of awarding new or continuing old
business with a party, including those actions involved in the decision-making
process, such as dictation of terms of the proposed business relationship
involved." Therefore, the exception that the FCPA carves out for the payment
of monies to foreign officials is extremely narrow in its scope; rarely, if ever,
allowing a person to make a payment to a foreign official that constitutes a
bribe.
5. Affirmative Defenses Under the FCPA
Though expansive, the FCPA does have limits, in that a seemingly guilty
defendant's acts may be justified by two statutory affirmative defenses.85 The
existence of such affirmative defenses may be viewed by some to be loopholes
in the U.S. legislation and thus significantly weaken the anti-bribery
protections. But successful use of these defenses will be difficult because the
defendant has the burden of proof to demonstrate that his actions fall under
either affirmative defense. 6
'international' business," making this distinction a non-issue. Id. at 8.
82 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b).
83 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b).
- 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(3)(A), 78dd-2(h)(4)(B), 78dd-3(f)(4)(A). The statutes enumerate
those acceptable practices naming only those actions:
which [are] ordinarily and commonly performed by [the] official in -
(i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents [needed] .. . to do
business in [the] foreign country; (ii) processing governmental papers... ;
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up. . . or scheduling inspections
associated with contract performance or ... related to transit of goods... ;
(iv) providing [utility services], loading and unloading cargo, or protecting
perishable[s] ... ; or (v) actions of a similar nature.
85 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c), 78dd-2(c), 78dd-3(c).
86 U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 4.
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The first affirmative defense under the FCPA is that the gift is lawful under
the written laws of the foreign official's country.8 7 This affirmative defense
is narrow in its scope. A payment or gratuity is only allowed if the written
laws of the foreign official's state specifically permit it.88 Furthermore, silence
within the foreign statute will not satisfy the affirmative defense.89 This
narrow defense of a payment to a foreign official is accompanied by an even
narrower second affirmative defense.9 °
The second affirmative defense allows payments if they are "a reasonable
and bona fide expenditure ... incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official...
and [are] directly related to (A) the promotion, demonstration, or explanation
of products or services; or (B) the execution of performance of a contract with
a foreign government or agency thereof."' Despite this defense, the law will
still convict where the expenditure is not considered bona fide,92 where the
official is treated lavishly, or where the costs of his accompanying family and
friends are paid as well.93
6. Complicity in Bribery as Covered Under US. Law
The FCPA also covers the aiding and abetting of bribery of foreign
officials, which adds to those actions that may incur criminal sanctions.94 The
statute dictates that the authorization of any payment of money or anything of
value to foreign officials is illegal.95 Further, teeth are given to the provision
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1).
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1).
89 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1); see also DONALD R. CURVER,
COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING
BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 21 (2d ed. 1999).
90 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2).
9' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2); see also U.S. REPORT PHASE 1,
supra note 62, at 4.
92 The statute provides "travel and lodging expenses" as examples of "bona fide"
expenditures. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2). It is certain that "bona
fide" expenditures does not include so-called "grease payments," payments to lower foreign
officials in order to expedite government action. This practice was acceptable before the FPCA
and its broad and inclusive definition of "foreign official." Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel
Wolff, Improper and Corrupt Corporate Payments - Corrupt Payments, in 3 SEC. & FED.
CORP. L. § 22:52 (2d ed. 2001).
93 See CURVER, supra note 89, at 22.
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).
95 15 U.S.C. § § 78dd- 1 (a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a); see also U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note
62, at 8.
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in that the crime of aiding and abetting bribery is complete and discrete,
regardless as to whether the authorized payment is ever successfully made.96
According to U.S. law, if persons conspire to commit any offense, they are
guilty of the crime of conspiracy,97 and therefore, they are guilty under the
FCPA as well.9" So, despite a lack of specific language criminalizing
complicity, incitement, and conspiracy of bribery in the FCPA statute, U.S.
law finds these to be crimes in that the criminal statutes in relation to these
offenses apply to all federal crimes, including the FCPA.99
7. What Sanctions Do Violators of the FCPA Face?
There is little doubt as to the pervasiveness of the jurisdiction of the FCPA,
its broad character, and its ability to prosecute nearly any U.S.-associated
entity for nearly any payment to a foreign official in regard to a business
transaction. The criminal law, however, would do little to deter bribery of
foreign officials if the law only imposed small, "slap-on-the-wrist" criminal
sanctions to guilty companies and persons. The severity of sanctions for
bribery of foreign officials can best be discussed in light of the criminal
sanctions for bribery of an American official.'00 Specifically, the FCPA
provides that natural persons who are officers, employees, directors, or agents
of a company found guilty of bribery of a foreign official on behalf of said
company are subject to a fine of not more than $100,000 or imprisonment of
not more than five years, or both.'0 ' Also, such a person is subject to a civil
penalty of not more than $10,000."2 The company cannot pay these fines,
either criminal or civil.1
0 3
96 U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 8.
9 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948).
9 See Christopher F. Corr & Judd Lawler, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't? The
OECD Convention and the Globalization ofAnti-Bribery Measures, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1249, 1261 n.37 (1999); see also United States v. Mead, 3 FCPAREP. 699.533 (D.N.J. 1998);
United States v. Tannenbaum, 4 FCPA REP. 699.583 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); United States v.
Lockheed Corp., 3 FCPA REP. 699.175 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
99 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2004); see also U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 9.
10 U.S. REPoRTPHASE 1, supra note 62, at 10-11. The only difference between the penalties
for bribery of a foreign official and those for a domestic official is the imprisonment period, as
the monetary sanctions are relatively the same. Id. at 11.
10) 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A).
102 Id. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(B).
103 Id. § 78dd-2(g)(3).
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Furthermore, the U.S. Code authorizes alternate fines to be paid when the
"person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in
pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant... .".." These alternate
fines may be "not more than the greater of twice the gross gain or twice the
gross loss.. .""' or up to $250,000 for natural persons.0 6 For legal persons,
the alternate fines also may be "not more than the greater of twice the gross
gain or twice the gross loss.. .,,07 or up to $500,000. I"' Since the FCPA
penalty is in excess of one year imprisonment, typically U.S. extradition
treaties will allow the United States to obtain and prosecute those who violate
the FCPA outside the United States.'0 9 Other provisions of the U.S. Code
authorize fines greater than those set forth in the FCPA where there is
pecuniary gain or loss. Department of Justice officials state that, through this
law, the fines imposed for violations of the FCPA have often been in excess
of those amounts specifically set forth by the FCPA."° Further sanctions exist
in that a company may be subject to up to $10,000 in civil penalties brought
by the Securities and Exchange Commission,"' or a civil action may be
brought by private individuals in accordance with the Racketeer Influenced
and Corruption Organizations Act."2 Finally, collateral sanctions may also
exist for a violating company as it may become ineligible for government
contracts or government benefits as a result of a FCPA conviction. 1 3 Thus the
penalty provisions of the FCPA are quite strong in light of the overwhelming
amount of adverse effects facing a convicted person or company.
104 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (1987).
105 Id.
106 Id. § 3571(b)(3).
107 Id. § 3571(d).
0' Id. § 3571(c)(3).
109 U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 12.
"1o Id. at 11. This U.S. Code provision is 18 U.S.C. § 3571 and its use under the FCPA is
illustrated by chart on the cited page.
.. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(l)(B) (2002).
112 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006). It should be noted, however, that the recognition of private
causes of action under this Act has not been recognized uniformly by the courts.
"3 See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2408 (1996) (prohibiting convicted persons from having defense-
related employment); 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (barring the eligibility of any company convicted of
a crime indicating a lack of business integrity).
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B. The United Kingdom's Fight Against Corruption: OECD Convention
Implementation Through the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916 and
the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
The United Kingdom signed the OECD Convention on December 17, 1997
and deposited its instrument of ratification on December 14, 1998.114 At the
time of ratification, the United Kingdom determined that its current domestic
law adequately implemented the OECD Convention." 5 The statutes that
Britain claimed satisfied the OECD Convention were the Public Bodies
Corrupt Practices Act of 1889 (Corruption Act of 1889),'16 the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1906 (Corruption Act of 1906), 17 and the Prevention of
Corruption Act 1916 (Corruption Act of 1916).'18 However, the OECD
Working Group found these claims by Britain to be unfounded and
recommended it adopt a modern corruption law implementing the OECD more
accurately." 9 To this end, Parliament included corruption provisions in the
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001 (Anti-Terrorism Act). 21
1. Who Cannot Offer Bribes Under British Law?
According to the Corruption Act of 1906, the prohibition against bribery
applies to "any person."' 121 While it is obvious from the plain meaning of the
phrase that person includes natural persons, British law is rather non-specific
4 OECD PROGRESS REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 84.
115 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WORKING GROUP ON
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, UNITED KINGDOM: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION, PHASE I Bis REPORT 1 (2002), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1 2/50/2498215.pdf [hereinafter UK REPORT PHASE 1 Bis].
116 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889, c. 69, §§ 1-10.
... Prevention of Corruption Act 1906, 1906, c. 34, §§ 1-4.
"1' Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, 1916, c. 64, §§ 2-4; see also UK REPORT PHASE 1
BIS, supra note 115, at 2. These acts were collectively referred to as the Prevention of
Corruption Acts of 1889-1916.
"9 ORGANISATION FOR CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS, UNITED KINGDOM: REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION
AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION 25 (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/24/275
4266.pdf [hereinafter UK REPORT PHASE 1].
120 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, pt. 12; see also UK REPORT PHASE
1 BIS, supra note 115, at 1.
121 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 § 1(1), para. 2; see also UK REPORT PHASE 1, supra
note 119, at 4 (noting that "any person" is also the language used in common law prohibition of
bribery).
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in regard to what extent "person" includes business entities. The Interpretation
Act of 1978 provides an interpretive definition of person, stating that person
"includes a body of persons corporate or unincorporate."'22  The Anti-
Terrorism Act does little to specify what types of business entities are included
under the Interpretation Act's definition of person, stating that the anti-bribery
law applies if "a national of the United Kingdom or body incorporated under
the law of any part of the United Kingdom. .. ." commits bribery in or outside
of the United Kingdom.'23 Thus, while the Corruption Act of 1906 appears to
include all U.K. persons, legal or natural, the modem codification of British
anti-bribery law only applies to legal persons that are incorporated. 114
2. Who Must One Bribe to Be Convicted Under British Law?
Originally, Britain attempted to follow its OECD obligations through the
Prevention of Corruption Acts of 1889-1916, contending that they would
apply to foreign officials. First, the Corruption Act of 1889 made it a
misdemeanor for a person to offer a bribe to any "member, officer, or servant
of any public body.... ."25 According to this Act,
"public body" means any council of a county or county of a city
or town, any council of a municipal borough, also any board,
commissioners, select vestry, or other body which has power to
act under and for the purposes of any Act relating to local
government, or the public health, or to poor law 26 or otherwise
122 Interpretation Act, 1978, c. 30, sched. 1, para. 1.
123 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act § 109(1)(a).
124 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 § l(1), para. 2; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security
Act 2001 § 109(1)(a); see ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, UNITED KINGDOM:
PHASE 2: REPORT ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997
RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 63-64
(2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/32/34599062.pdf[hereinafter UKREPORT
PHASE 2]. It appears that unincorporated bodies can thus commit offenses in the United
Kingdom but it is difficult to prosecute them because of the absence of a theory of attribution.
Instead a prosecutor must prove the individual guilt of each person involved in the
unincorporated enterprise. UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra, at 63.
125 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 1(2).
126 "Poor law" refers to the British system for the provision of social security. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1199 (8th ed. 2004).
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to administer money raised by rates in pursuance of any public
general Act, but does not include any public body as above
defined existing elsewhere than in the United Kingdom. 127
This broad definition was expanded even further in 1916 to include "local
and public authorities of all descriptions." 128 Although the anti-bribery statute
covers illicit payments to all officials and members of public welfare entities,
the typical form of bribery may also occur through intermediaries and
representatives of public officials. For this reason, the Corruption Act of 1906
prohibits illicit payments made to "any agent" to take an action "in relation to
[his or her] principal's affairs or business ... ,,129 The statute defines a
"principal" to include an employer and an "agent" to be "any person employed
by or acting for another."'13' Further, the Act notes that "[a] person serving
under the Crown or under any corporation or any, borough, county, or district
council, or board of guardians, is an agent within the meaning of [the] Act., 131
Finally, the Corruption Act of 1916 has a catch-all provision that expands the
bodies that cannot be bribed according to the Corruption Acts 1889 and 1906,
stipulating that the bodies discussed therein include "local and public
authorities of all descriptions."'3 Upon signing of the OECD, the United
Kingdom contended that there is "no legal impediment" to applying these laws
to "public bodies," "agents," and "principals" of foreign States, 13 but there is
no mandate within the statutes that this is how the laws must be applied
either. 13
4
In an effort to clarify this discrepancy, Parliament passed the Anti-
Terrorism Act, which extended Britain's anti-bribery laws to include foreign
27 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 7 (emphasis added). The emphasized portion of
the definition was later changed by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001
§ 108(3).
' Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 § 4.
129 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 § 1(1).
130 Id. § 1(2).
131 Id. § 1(3).
132 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916 § 4(2).
131 UK REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 119, at 3.
134 See Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 § 108(3). Indeed, the statement that
the bribery law is not prevented from being applied to foreign public bodies and persons seems
contrary to the language which was replaced by the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 that limited the
application of the Corruption Act 1889 to "not include any public body.., existing elsewhere
than in the United Kingdom .. "; see also generally Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act;
Prevention of Corruption Act 1906; Prevention of Corruption Act 1916.
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officials by amending the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916.' First,
the Anti-Terrorism Act broadened the scope of the Corruption Act 1889's
public body definition, substituting the phrase "and includes any body which
exists in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom and is equivalent
to any body described above" in place of the statute's old language limiting the
definition of public body to only those entities within Britain.136 The Anti-
Terrorism Act also amended the Corruption Act 1906, specifically adding to
section 1 of that Act subsection 4, which states:
For the purposes of this Act it is immaterial if-
(a) the principal's affairs or business have no connection with the
United Kingdom and are conducted in a country or territory
outside the United Kingdom;
(b) the agent's functions have no connection with the United
Kingdom and are carried out in a country or territory outside the
United Kingdom. 137
Finally, the Act further amends the language of the Corruption Act 1916,
adding in section 4(2) that the authorities of all descriptions includes
"authorities existing in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom."' 38
According to the United Kingdom, these changes bring its domestic law into
compliance with its OECD obligations under the OECD Convention. 3 9
3. What Acts Constitute Bribery Under British Law?
Acts that constitute bribery remained unchanged by the Anti-Terrorism Act
2001, as that Act clarified the applicability of the Prevention of Corruption
Acts 1 889-1916 to foreign officials.14 ° According to British law, one commits
bribery if he or she "give[s], promise[s], or offer[s] any gift, loan, fee, reward,
or advantage whatsoever to any person.., as an inducement to or reward for
or otherwise ... [for] doing or forbearing to do anything in respect of any
matter or transaction whatsoever, actual or proposed.... "'4 The Corruption
'3 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, at 58.
136 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act § 108(3).
137 Id. § 108(2).
138 Id. § 108(4).
139 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, at 9.
141 See generally Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.
4' Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 1(2).
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Act 1906 broadens this more, making a bribe any giving or agreement to give
or offer "any gift or consideration as an inducement or reward for doing or
forbearing to do ... any act.... " 42 The statute notes that "consideration"
encompasses "valuable consideration of any kind,"'43 including, courts have
held, gifts both intangible and non-pecuniary. 1"
British law also finds bribery where the gift or consideration is made for the
benefit of a third party, finding bribery where the bribed person takes action
"for the benefit of [the bribing person] or of another person ... ."145 However,
it should be noted that this third party beneficiary language is not expressly
included in the Corruption Act 1906, providing a potential loophole for
prosecution. 46 Still, the British contend that such a situation where only the
Corruption Act 1906 will apply and the beneficiary receives the benefit (a
situation where the strict language of the statute would arguably result in a
failure to convict the briber) would nonetheless lead to a conviction in that the
benefit to the third party still falls within the statute's definition of
"consideration" as "any valuable consideration."'47
Finally, it should be noted that the Corruption Act 1906 does not require
that the offer or gift be in order to obtain business, as the statute is silent as to
what purpose, if any, the offer must have.'48 Purpose of the bribe is also
irrelevant under the Corruption Act 1889, which finds bribery when the bribe
is made to get a person to act "in respect of any matter or transaction
whatsoever...., 49
4. What Intent Is Required to Be Convicted for Bribery Under British
Law?
Although the purpose of the bribe is irrelevant under British law, a scienter
element does exist under the offense of bribery. 50 The mens rea required by
British law for a person to be convicted of bribery is set forth in the Corruption
142 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 § 1(1) (emphasis added).
143 Id. § 1(2).
14 See, e.g., R v. Braithwaite, (1983) 77 Crim. App. 34; Currie v. Misa, (1875) L.R. 10 Exch.
153, 162.
'" Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 1(2).
146 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.
147 UK REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 119, at 5.
148 Prevention of Corruption Act 1906.
149 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 1(2).
ISo Id. § 1; Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 § 1(1).
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Acts 1889 and 1906, which require that a person "corruptly" offer or give a
bribe to another person. 5' "Corruptly" has been defined by the court as a
simple English adverb which meant "purposely doing an act that the law
forbids as tending to corrupt."'12 The state of mind required for a bribery
conviction is of an intentional nature, in that a person must know that he is
offering something of value to another in exchange for a favor in contravention
of the law.'53 This knowledge requirement does not mean that it is "necessary
under the 1906 Act to prove that the offer or conferring was intended to
influence the recipient in any specific way; it is sufficient if the intent was to
influence the recipient in a general way."'54
5. Affirmative Defenses Under British Law
No affirmative defenses are set forth by any of the statutes, thus no
defensible excuse exists for acting in contravention of the law.'55
6. Complicity in Bribery as Covered by British Law
British anti-bribery law also bars complicity in actions of bribery. It is a
principle of the common law that two or more persons may be a principal in
the commission of a single crime.'56 This common law was codified by
Parliament in the Accessories and Abettors Act of 1861 (Abettors Act 1861)'
and later amended by the Criminal Law Act 1977.158 The Abettors Act 1861
establishes that "[w]hosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the
commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at
common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to
be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender." '159 Since the crime of
bribery is codified in an "Act passed," the law of aiding and abetting would
'5 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 1; Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 § 1(1).
152 UK REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 119, at 4 (discussing R. v. Wellburn, (1979) 69 Crim.
App. 254).
153 Id.
154 Id.
' See generally Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act; Prevention of Corruption Act 1906;
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916; Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act.
516 See generally RuSSELL HEATON, CRIMINAL LAW 367-400 (2004).
.. Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, c. 94, § 8.
58 Criminal Law Act, 1977, c. 45, § 65(7), sched. 12.
Accessories and Abettors Act § 8.
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apply to bribery under British law as noted by the OECD Working Group on
the OECD Convention.
160
Furthermore, persons can be convicted for attempted bribery according to
section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act of 1981, so long as the person "does an
act which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the
offence. ....,,16' Finally, persons can be convicted for conspiracy to commit
bribery according to section 1 of the Criminal Law Act 1977, which finds it a
crime "if a person agrees with any other[s] . . . that ... conduct shall be
pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their
intentions ... (a) will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any
offence or offences by one or more of the parties to the agreement .... ,, 62
7. What Sanctions Do Violators of the British Corruption Laws Face?
Under British criminal law, certain offenses can be tried in a summary trial
in a Magistrate's court without the benefit of a jury or in a Crown Court with
the benefit of a jury.163 The penalties imposed upon a person convicted of
bribery vary depending upon whether there is a summary conviction by a
magistrate or a conviction on indictment by a jury." 4 The penalty for a
summary conviction for bribery includes "imprisonment for a term not
exceeding 6 months or to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum . *,,65 or
both. 66 A conviction on indictment carries a greater penalty, prescribing a
160 UK REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 119, at 7.
161 Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c. 47, § 1(1).
162 Criminal Law Act § 1(1), 1(4) (defining offense as "an offence triable in England and
Wales").
163 JOHN SPRACK, EMMINS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1-2 (9th ed. 2002); see also MICHAEL
ALLEN, TEXTBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 12 (8th ed. 2005). The decision as to whether to have a
summary trial or not is made by the Magistrate court pursuant to section 19 of the Magistrate's
Court Act. In deciding whether to hold a summary trial, the court considers the representations
of the prosecutor and the accused, the circumstances of the case, the gravity of the offense, and
the sentence available before the Magistrate Court versus that available before the Crown Court.
However, to proceed summarily, consent of the accused is required because the accused must
be allowed to assert his or her right to trial by jury.
164 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 2(a)(i)-(ii); Prevention of Corruption Act 1906
§ 1(l)(a)-{b).
165 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, 1980, c. 43, § 32, pt. 1. See also SPRACK, supra note 163,
at 173. The statutory maximum fine is £5,000, which as of February 12, 2006 is the equivalent
of $8,721.51 U.S.
166 Public Bodies Corruption Practices Act § 2(a)(i); Prevention of Corruption Act 1906
§ 1(1)(a).
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person convicted may be "[imprisoned] for a term not exceeding 7 years or
[fined], or to both."' 67 This fine for a conviction on indictment has no upper
limit, and the penalties for conspiracy and complicity are also identical. 68
In regard to civil penalties, British law does not appear to impose any civil
or administrative sanctions on convicted persons. 6 9 However, the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) 7 ° allows the Crown Court to decide upon a
recoverable amount and make a confiscation order for convicted persons who
"benefit [ ] from [their] particular criminal conduct."'' The amount
recoverable is generally an amount equal to the defendant's benefit.'72
Furthermore, Part V of the POCA allows a right of action for civil forfeiture,
meaning that the Director of the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA)'73 can bring
an action to recover property gained by a person through "unlawful
conduct"--actions that can be brought even if the person is acquitted of the
criminal charges.'74 Finally, those convicted of bribery under British law face
numerous indirect sanctions including disqualification for contracts with the
Department for International Development,'75 withholding of transaction
167 Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 2(a)(ii); Prevention of Corruption Act 1906
§ l(l)(b).
168 UK REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 119, at 9.
169 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, at 74.
170 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, 2002, c. 29.
171 Id. § 6(3)(c). However, it should be noted that § 6 requires several criteria for a person
to be susceptible to a confiscation order including that the convicted person have a "criminal
lifestyle" and that the prosecutor or Director of the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) has
requested a confiscation order. Id. § 6.
172 Id. § 7(1).
171 This is an agency established in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, whose powers include
the ability to apply for criminal confiscation orders, apply for restraint orders, bring appeals, and
enforce confiscation orders. Id. § 1, sched. 1.
174 Id. pt. 5; see also Ian Smith & Danny Friedman, Crime doesn't pay - the new asset
recovery laws, NEW L.J., Jan.-Dec. 2003, at 1875.
"' The Department for International Development (DFID) is the United Kingdom's
department in charge of promoting development and reducing poverty in other countries
throughout the world. Clauses 10 and 23 of a standard DFID procurement contract disqualify
or suspend violators of the Corruption Acts from obtaining DFID contracts. General Conditions,
Dep't for Int'l Dev., http:// www.dfid.gov.uk/procurement/generalconditionsmarch04.pdf (last
visited Mar. 9, 2007).
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approval from the Export Credits and Guarantees Department, 76 and being
prevented from voting as well as holding public office. 1
77
IV. NOT GOOD ENOUGH, OLD CHAP: AMERICA'S IMPLEMENTATION AND
BRITAIN'S NEED FOR CLARITY
The United States and United Kingdom both have declared that they have
implemented the OCED Convention through the pieces of legislation discussed
above. 7 ' But how accurate are these proclamations? This Note now looks at
the adequacy of the implementation of the OECD statute and compares each
state's enactment of each particular issue involved in the offense of bribery of
a foreign official.
A. Adequacy in Regard to Who Cannot Offers Bribes
The U.S. law is in accordance with the OECD Convention making it a
crime for "any person" to commit bribery,'79 which, according to the language
of Article 2, includes legal persons, such as corporations.' The painstaking
detail in which the U.S. law lists all entities to which the FCPA is applicable'
is in stark contrast to the British law. The British law can be read to be in
accordance with the OECD Convention's "any person" language,8 2 but the
statutes are ambiguous in nature, relying upon the Interpretations Act of 1977
to ultimately define the term person as inducing "persons corporate or
",183unincorporate.
176 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, at 77; see also Export Credit and Guarantee
Department, Public Information, Policy on Bribery and Corruption, http://www.ecgd.gov.uk/
index/pihome/policyonbribery and corruption.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
"' Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act § 2(c)-(e).
178 OECD PROGRESS REPORT 2006, supra note 15, at 84, 87.
171 OECD Convention, supra note 11, art. 1.
"8' Id. art. 2. See also Organisation on Economic Co-operation and Development,
Commentaries on the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Officials in International
Business Transactions, para. 20, http://www.oecd.org/document/l/0,2340,en_2649_37447_
2048129_1_1_1_37447,00.html [hereinafter OECD Convention Commentaries] (last visited
Mar. 9, 2007). This provision states that "[i]n the event that, under the legal system of a Party,
criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that Party shall not be required to
establish such criminal responsibility." Id.
... See supra Part III.A.J and accompanying text.
182 OECD Convention, supra note 11, art. 1.
183 Interpretation Act, sched. 1, para. 1.
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Although a court may read the language as broadly as possible and comply
with the OECD Convention, the modem implementation of the law does not
cover acts of bribery perpetrated by unincorporated groups of individuals." 4
This lack of clarity is one reason why the OECD Working Group has
recommended that the United Kingdom implement a comprehensive law solely
addressing corruption," 5 and why the FCPA's protections allow for better
combating of the international bribery dilemma.
B. Adequacy as to Who Must Be Bribed for an Action to Be Considered
Bribery of a Foreign Official
In regard to the scope of who cannot be bribed under the appropriate
domestic law, the United States is not only more stringent than the British, but
also exceeds the protections mandated by the OECD Convention itself.
Indeed, the OECD and Britain fail to directly address an important bribery
situation expressly prohibited by U.S. law-the bribery of political party
officials.8 6 Although Britain is under no international obligation to implement
such a law-as the OECD has failed to speak to it-this does not discount the
fact that it should be made law. A corporation can exert tremendous influence
in a foreign state and even exchange campaign financing of some sort for
political favors upon the condition that the bribed party's officials get into
office.
However, U.S. law in this area is not without faults. Although the FCPA
bars payments to employees of foreign governments, it does not explicitly
indicate that this includes foreign judiciary officials, thus leaving a potential
loophole.8 7 One further ambiguity lies in the fact that although the FCPA
' See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
181 UKREPoRT PHASE 1, supra note 119, at 24-27; UK REPORT PHASE 1 Bis, supra note 115,
at 17-18; UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, paras. 246-58.
186 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(2), 78dd-2(a)(2), 78dd-3(a)(2); see also OECD Convention
Commentaries, supra note 180, para. 14. The only language under the OECD Convention that
may apply to political parties of a foreign state may be the public enterprises of a foreign state.
However, the definition set forth in the Commentaries indicates that this term seems to mean
those entities that the state's government has some control or interest in and thus likely does not
include political parties.
'87 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, WORKING GROUP ON
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, UNITED STATES: PHASE 2: REPORT ON
APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMMITTING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 1997 RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING
BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL BusINESS TRANSACTIONS, para. 107 (2002), available at http://
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covers the bribery of instrumentalities of other governments,'88 it is unclear
whether this would include entities in the process of privatization or
enterprises in which the government is a shareholder.189
Even these few ambiguities pale in comparison to British law. The British
law bars foreign bribery essentially by adding a foreign element to domestic
corruption law.' 9 Thus, an international issue is dealt with using language
specifically designed for domestic purposes.'9 1 This makes the law on the task
rather unclear and is one reason why the Working Group has proposed that the
United Kingdom enact a statute whose sole purpose is to address foreign anti-
bribery as addressed in the OECD Convention.'92 Furthermore, unlike the
FCPA,' 93 the British law fails to specifically bar bribery of members of
international organizations, only potentially doing so in section 108(4) of the
Anti-Terrorism Act by expanding "public bodies" to include bodies outside the
United Kingdom.194
C. Adequacy of What Acts Constitute Bribery
The OECD Convention requires states to outlaw any giving of "pecuniary
or other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries.., for that
official or for a third party, in order that the official act.., in relation to the
performance of official duties.... "" Both U.K. and U.S. law obviously cover
the situation in which a quid pro quo, tangible gift in exchange for favorable
treatment, or a contract is made between a person and a foreign official. 9 6
However, both statutes are ambiguous in regard to whether or not the statutes
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/19/1962084.pdf [hereinafter U.S. REPORT PHASE 2].
188 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(B), 78dd-2(a)(1)(B), 78dd-3(a)(1)(B).
189 But to what extent must the government be a shareholder? The answer as to whether or
not these entities constitute instrumentalities of the government is unclear under U.S. law. U.S.
REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 187, para. 108.
190 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, para. 183.
... This is particularly true in regard to the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889, where
the original language of the Act limited the public bodies applicable to those within the United
Kingdom.
19' UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, para. 248.
193 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(h)(2)(B), 78dd-2(h)(2)(B), 78dd-3(h)(2)(B).
'94 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act § 108(4); UK REPORT PHASE 1 BIs, supra note
115, at 9.
"' OECD Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(1).
196 See generally supra Part III.A.3 and B.3.
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cover bribery for the benefit of third parties.' 97 One other condition present
under the FCPA that is absent from the British law and may not be in
accordance with the OECD Convention is the requirement that for bribery by
U.S. persons, natural and legal, that takes place within the United States, the
person must make use of"interstate commerce." 98 The United States contends
that this requirement is in practice a non-issue given the expansive definition
of interstate commerce within the FCPA and other statutes, and the fact that
the crime at issue involves bribery affecting foreign states.'99 However, there
has not been a clarification in regard to the validity of this claim as U.S. case
law has yet to resolve it.
2°0
D. Adequacy in Regard to What Intent Is Required for a Bribery Conviction
The intent requirement under U.S. law finds bribery where a natural or
legal person makes a bribe to influence a foreign official on the belief that the
official will use his or her influence in order to help the briber obtain or retain
business.201 This intent is indicated by the language "corruptly" within the
statute, and it reads a knowledge element into the crime itself.2.2 Similarly, the
British law uses the word "corruptly" in its statutes, but "the courts have
indicated that it is difficult to interpret the word 'corruptly,' and that much of
the concern about the existing statutes 'relates to the archaic language and
formulations and.., in particular to the definition of the offence of corruption
as acting 'corruptly.' ' ,203 Although the OECD has noted the awkwardness
of defining corruptly with the word corruption, there is little indication that
197 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, para. 181; U.S. REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 187,
para. 106 (discussing United States v. Kenny International Corp., (Cr. No. 79-372), D.D.C.
1979, where bribery for benefit of a third party may have been an issue, but the plea agreement
reached in the matter is unclear as to whether the FCPA actually applied in this respect).
198 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a). This restriction to interstate commerce is
made to bring the FCPA solely within the powers of the U.S. federal government granted to it
by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note
62, at 3.
'99 U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 3.
200 U.S. REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 187, paras. 103-05.
201 See supra Part IIIA.4.
202 Id.
203 UK REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 119, at 4 (quoting a Home Office report from June 1997
addressing this issue) [internal quotations omitted].
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this language in anyway abrogates the concept set forth in the OECDConvention.2°
The British law requires that no specific purpose be had by the briber in his
bribe, requiring only a general purpose to gain an advantage.2"5 This is broader
than the FCPA, which requires the bribe be made "in order to assist [the
briber] in obtaining or retaining business.... "206 In this regard, the British law
appears to be more stringent that the FCPA and maybe even the OECD
Convention, whose own language indicates that the bribe should be limited to
the purpose of obtaining or retaining business.2"7
E. Does the OECD Convention Allow the United States 'Affirmative Defenses?
The OECD Convention does not address any possible affirmative defenses
to bribery.208 The first U.S. affirmative defense, allowing payments that are
lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign official's country,
appears to be in accordance with the OECD Convention.20 9 Though not
explicitly stated in the Convention, this affirmative defense is allowable in
light of the Commentaries on Article 1, which stipulate that "[i]t is not an
offence... if the advantage was permitted or required by the written law or
regulation of the foreign public official's country, including case law."21
However, the Working Group has noted that the second affirmative
defense, in regard to reasonable and bona fide expenditure payments,211 may
not be in accordance with the Convention.2 12 U.S. officials claim, however,
that bona fide payment of expenses is not corrupt, and making this an
204 See U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62; U.S. REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 187; UK
REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 119; UK REPORT PHASE 1 Bis, supra note 115; UK REPORT PHASE
2, supra note 124.
205 See supra Part III.B.4.
206 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)(A)-(B), (3)(A)-(B) (1998); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-
2(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)(A)-(B), (3)(A)-(B) (1998); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(a)(1)(A)-(B), (2)(A)-(B),
(3)(A)-(B) (1998).
207 OECD Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(1).
201 See generally, id. There is not an affirmative defense in the classic sense under the British
laws. However, the agency/principal relationship seems to provide a respite from absolute
responsibility for a subordinate in situations where the principal has ordered or consented to the
bribe; see infra note 215 and accompanying text.
209 U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 4.
210 OECD Convention Commentaries, supra note 180, para. 8.
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2).
212 U.S. REPORT PHASE 1, supra note 62, at 4.
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affirmative defense, where the defendant has the burden of proof, ensures that
the defense will only be available to persons who truly have not made corrupt
payments. 213 This claim may bejustified by the fact that there is no controlling
deference to the company's characterization of the payment under question,
making it nearly impossible for an actual corrupt payment to sit within this
defense and avoid prosecution.214
A defense of sorts exists under British law based upon the agent/principal
system of determining bribery under the Corruption Act 1906.215 As noted by
the Working Group, general principles of agency law will not hold an agent
responsible for his actions if the principal consents to the agent's actions. 216
Therefore, a person may avoid conviction for bribery in those
circumstances where the principal, namely the foreign official's boss or
government, has consented to the bribe.217 Although Britain contends that such
an exception to agent responsibility does not exist within its law, no case law
has dealt with this issue, so the question remains unsettled.218
F. Adequacy of Complicity Provisions of Anti-Bribery Statutes
Both British and American laws have firmly established principles in regard
to complicity, attempt, and conspiracy crimes, which appear to apply to the
states' bribery statutes.219 This is in accordance with the OECD Convention,
which requires that "[e]ach Party shall take any measures necessary to
establish that complicity in, including incitement, aiding and abetting, or
authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public official shall be a criminal
offence. 22°
213 Id.
214 Id. Indeed, the Working Group notes that to date no payment prosecuted under the FCPA
has fallen into this statutory defense. Id.
215 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, para. 182.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See discussion supra Parts III.A.6, III.B.6.
220 OECD Convention, supra note 11, art. 1(2).
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G. Adequacy of Sanctions Imposed Upon Convicted Persons Under the
Respective Statutes
The OECD Convention requires that "[t]he bribery of a foreign public
official... be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal
penalties... [and that the] penalties... be comparable to that applicable to the
bribery of the Party's own public officials.. .," further requiring that natural
persons be subject to "deprivation of liberty."22' Also, the OECD Convention
requires that the states confiscate the value of the benefit gained from the act
of bribery as well as consider the imposition of civil penalties.
222
Until 2002, the British law only partially complied with the OECD
Convention, providing imprisonment and fines for natural persons and steep
fines for legal persons.223 With the passing of POCA, the British law now fully
complies with the OECD Convention, although the OECD Working Group
does note that, as of March 2005, the British government has not seized any
assets in any foreign bribery cases.224 However, the POCA is still a relatively
new piece of legislation, and perhaps cases of asset seizure in relation to
foreign bribery are forthcoming.
The U.S. law provides the necessarysanctions required under the OECD
Convention. Although the imprisonment period for natural persons is less than
both British foreign bribery and bribery of a domestic person, the strength of
the FCPA lies in its use of civil sanctions.225 Although the Working Group
notes that the fines imposed for those convicted under the FCPA have been
"rather moderate, 226 the group also notes that in light of collateral
consequences of FCPA, convictions make the law effective overall.227
221 Id. art. 3(1).
222 Id. art. 3(3)-(4). Since the British law adds a foreign element to domestic bribery law, the
sanctions for bribery of a foreign official are identical to the sanctions for bribery of a British
official, complying fully with Article 3(3) of the OECD Convention. UK REPORT PHASE 2,
supra note 124, para. 228.
223 See supra Part III.B.7. These sanctions are particularly harsh in light of the lack of an
upper limit on the fines that may be imposed for a conviction on indictment. See supra note 168
and accompanying text.
224 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, para. 23 1.
225 See discussion supra Part IIIA. 7.
226 U.S. REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 187, para. 48.
227 Id para. 52.
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V. MAYBE THIS WILL WORK: FERRETING OUT A SOLUTION TO BRITAIN'S
DISCREPANCIES
As a major trading power, the holes in the United Kingdom's anti-bribery
law can adversely affect the entire world, and specifically the United States,
whose laws appear to be more in line with the OCED Convention as well as
more stringent in their own right.22 The OECD has said that "[i]t is widely
recognised that the current substantive law governing bribery in the UK is
characterised by complexity and uncertainty. 2 29 It is difficult to apply laws
created to be domestic in scope to international issues, particularly when the
United Kingdom's rationale that its laws are in accordance with the OECD
Convention lies in the fact that the law maybe interpreted accordingly.23 This
complexity has led the OECD Working Group to continuously recommend that
the United Kingdom enact a comprehensive and focused statute relating to
bribery of foreign officials. 3
As of the writing of this Note, the British government, while
acknowledging the OECD's plea for a clearer and stronger anti-bribery law
that is less reliant upon court interpretation,232 has yet to pass such a law.
However, there is at present a Draft Bill on Corruption within the Parliament
that may conform more closely to the OECD's recommendations.233 The Draft
Corruption Bill is deliberate and explicit in many of its definitions of important
concepts in foreign public official anti-bribery law. The Bill discusses and
defines "competitive advantage," as well as how one confers or obtains it,
234
the meaning of the term "corruptly" in several contexts (without using the
word corruption),235 and specifically addresses the foreign official issue.236
228 See discussion supra Part IV.
229 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, at 58; see also generally HOUSE OF LORDS AND
HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT CORRUPTION BILL, DRAFT CORRUPTION
BILL: REPORT AND EVIDENCE, 2002-3, H.L. 157, available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtcorr/157/157.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2007) [hereinafter
Committee Report on UK Draft Corruption Bill].
230 Committee Report on UK Draft Corruption Bill, supra note 229.
231 See UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, para. 247; UK REPORT PHASE 1, supra note
119, at 25.
232 See generally Committee Report on UK Draft Corruption Bill, supra note 229.
233 Corruption: Draft Legislation, 2003, Bill CM 5777, available at http://www.archive2.
official-documents.co.uk/document/cm57/5777/5777.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
234 Id. at cls. 4-5, 8-9.
235 Id. at cl. 5.
236 Id. at cls. 11(2), 13.
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However, the Draft Bill does leave some problematic elements of the old
law, particularly retaining the agency/principal system despite
recommendations from the judicial committee to remove the concept from the
law.2 37 The Home Office intends to keep the agency/principal system because
corruption stems from subversion of loyalty to a principal, because the concept
is present in the law of other States like Canada and Australia, and because of
a concern that innocent actions may be included under the statute otherwise.238
The inclusion of this contentious provision may be what has restricted the
passing of this comprehensive scheme, which would at least be better than the
current United Kingdom laws. Therefore, the present administration should
do all that it can to enact this legislation. If this means removing the
contentious element of the agency/principal relationship, so much the better,
since this element of the present British scheme leads the Working Group to
find the law complex and uncertain. 239 Thus the Draft Corruption Bill, while
an admirable step at bringing clarity and certainty to the present conglomerate
of British anti-bribery laws, is still but a small step in the right direction toward
the creation of a clear and coherent anti-bribery law on par with the United
States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
237 See THE GOVERNMENT REPLY TO THE REPORT FROM THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT
CORRUPTION BILL, 2003, H.L. Paper 157, 12-15, available at http://www.archive2.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm60/6086/6086.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2007).
238 Id. 3-7.
239 UK REPORT PHASE 2, supra note 124, at 58.
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